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Learning to Trust: Networks
Effects Through Time
Davide Barrera and Gerhard G. van de Bunt
This article investigates the effects of information originating from social networks on
the development of interpersonal trust relations in the context of a dialysis department
of a Dutch medium-sized hospital. Hypotheses on learning effects are developed from
existing theories and tested using longitudinal data concerning the complete networks
of trust and (informal) communication relations among employees observed at four
different time points. The results support the existence of a learning mechanism
operating both within dyads and through the social networks in which the dyads are
embedded: actors learn to trust (or distrust) each other from their own past experience
as well as from information that they receive from colleagues with whom they have
regular communication.
Introduction
In many organizations, cooperation among colleagues
is an essential prerequisite for the effective functioning
and performance of the organization. Functioning as a
‘lubricant’ for cooperation (Arrow, 1974), trust can
substitute more ‘expensive’ monitoring devices (Chiles
and McMackin, 1996; Creed and Miles, 1996; Das and
Teng, 1998). Interpersonal trust has thus received
much attention in the field of organizational relations
(Burt and Knez, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995; McAlister,
1995; Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998;
Kramer, 1999; Burt, 2005; Bijlsma-Frankema and
Costa, 2005).
Within organizations, dyadic relations of trust are
typically embedded in a complex system of social
relations with third parties (Granovetter, 1985). In fact,
colleagues working in the same environment have
frequent opportunities of contact ranging from formal
meetings to informal gatherings such as during lunch
breaks. This set of formal and informal contacts creates
networks of relations whose importance for organi-
zational performance [see Flap et al. (1998) for
review] as well as for intra-organizational dynamics
[see Krackhardt and Brass (1994) for review] has been
increasingly recognized. Particularly, informal conver-
sations provide colleagues with opportunities to
discuss personal issues as well as to gossip about
other colleagues (Burt and Knez, 1995; Wittek and
Wielers, 1998; Burt, 2005). Thus, the development of
dyadic trust relations between colleagues could be
affected by the network of informal conversations. In
this article, we answer the following question: to what
extent does the network of informal communication
influence interpersonal trust relations among
colleagues?
In spite of the conspicuous body of research on
trust, there is no universally accepted definition of the
concept. Trust is sometimes viewed as a psychological
state (McAlister, 1995), as a choice behaviour
(Dasgupta, 1988), or as a relational attribute possibly
incorporating both aspects (Mayer et al., 1995). Most
of these definitions, but especially those that conceive
trust as a choice behaviour, share one key element: the
trustor’s (Ego) decision is based on her assessment of
the trustworthiness of the person to be trusted (Alter)
(Gambetta, 1988; Coleman, 1990; Hardin, 2002).1 In
embedded settings, this assessment can be influenced
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by the information about Alter that is available to Ego
once she faces the trust problem.
The kind of information effects in which we are
interested is typically associated with Coleman’s
conceptualization of network closure as social capital
(Coleman, 1990, chapter 12; Burt, 2005, chapter 3).
According to Coleman’s argument, information circu-
lates faster in denser networks. Thus, for every Ego-
Alter pair, Ego’s assessment of Alter’s trustworthiness
is facilitated by the amount of information that is
available to Ego through third parties. This argument
is consistent with both information diffusion models
(e.g. Buskens and Yamaguchi, 1999) and network
control models (e.g. Raub and Weesie, 1990).2
However, empirical evidence on the effects of available
information on interpersonal trust is scarce and mostly
based on cross-sectional design, thus making the
inference of causal mechanisms mainly speculative
[notable exceptions are Wittek (2001) and Van de
Bunt et al. (2005)].
A different type of evidence comes from experi-
mental research [see, for instance, Barrera and Buskens
(2008)], but this poses a problem of external validity,
due to the artificiality of the situations in which the
behaviour is observed. Therefore, our aim is to
investigate the effects of information originating from
informal social networks on interpersonal trust
between colleagues, addressing the shortcomings of
existing research in two ways. The use of longitudinally
collected survey data of complete networks of co-
workers allows us, first, to improve on external validity
and, second, to make stronger claims on the causal
relations observed.
The definition of a social network depends on the
content of the relationship, which is being studied. If
trust is defined at the dyadic level, every trust relation
identifies a directed tie and the set of all trust relations
among colleagues constitutes a social network. The set
of informal communication relationships constitutes a
second network. Since people who trust each other are
likely to speak regularly with each other as well, we can
expect a certain extent of overlap between these two
social networks. Thus, it is plausible that the social
network formed by co-workers who talk regularly to
each other influences the network of trust relations,
and vice versa, the existing network of trust relations
partly determines the informal communication net-
work. Ideally, the two types of effects should be
addressed simultaneously. However, here, we will focus
on changes in the trust network resulting from the
exchange of information between the actors, neglecting
potential effects of the trust network on the commu-
nication network.
We opted for this approach for three reasons. First,
existing theories stress the role of social networks in
shaping trust relations and not vice versa (Buskens,
2002; Burt, 2005). Second, focusing on the effects of
the informal communication network on dyadic trust
relations is not a severe limitation because descriptive
analyses of our data (see section ‘Personnel’) show that
the trust network changes significantly across time,
while the network of informal communication is rather
stable. Third, given the current state of the art, our
data are too complex to be analysed using existing
statistical methods designed to tackle this kind of
reverse-causality issues. We refer to section ‘Results’
for more details of the statistical model we applied.
In the next section, we will summarize existing
theories and present hypotheses. Subsequently, we will
describe the data and the methods used and present
our results. Finally, we will discuss our findings,
address some methodological issues, and give sugges-
tions for future research.
Theories and Hypotheses
Coleman (1990, chapter 5) describes a trust problem as
an interaction between two actors (Ego and Alter)
characterized by an incentive structure corresponding
to the trust game (Dasgupta, 1988). However, here, we
are studying trust relations between colleagues, and our
data do not contain any information on actual
behaviour in a real trust problem. Therefore, we
need to adopt a less formal definition of trust, focusing
on Ego’s attitude towards Alter. We refer to a trust
relation between Ego and Alter as a directed tie from
Ego to Alter that can exist in three different states: Ego
trusts Alter, Ego distrusts Alter, or Ego is neutral
towards Alter. We state that Ego (dis)trusts Alter ‘if
she is (not) willing to confide personal information
concerning both private and work-related information
to Alter’. Furthermore, we assume that a trust relation
is in a neutral state if ‘Ego is neither willing nor
unwilling to confide in Alter’. This state of neutrality
represents the middle point on a hypothetical con-
tinuum between trust and distrust. Furthermore, since
we have defined trust as a personal attitude held by
Ego, we assume that Ego’s attitude towards Alter
depends on her assessment of Alter’s trustworthiness
(cf. Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002). In this context,
Alter’s trustworthiness refers to his capability to handle
Ego’s confidential information with due care.
We safely assume that Ego and Alter as members of
the same organization are not complete strangers.
In such a case, trust problems are said to occur
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in embedded settings (Granovetter, 1985). In
embedded settings, Ego possesses or can easily obtain
information about Alter’s trustworthiness through
third parties. In addition, if Ego is somehow related
to Alter, directly or through third parties, she has the
possibility to reward Alter if he honors her trust as well
as to retaliate if he abuses her trust. Two types of
embeddedness can be identified: dyadic embeddedness
and network embeddedness (Buskens, 2002; Buskens
and Raub, 2002). Dyadic embeddedness refers to
situations in which a relation between Ego and
Alter pre-exists the specific trust problem or to
situations in which Ego and Alter are likely to be
facing each other again after the specific trust problem
occurred. Network embeddedness refers to situations
in which there exist third parties who are connected to
both Ego and Alter by means of a relationship,
allowing third parties to provide Ego with information
about Alter, as well as to receive information about
Alter from Ego.
The extra information available to Ego in embedded
settings produces two types of effects on Ego’s trust
decision: learning and control (Buskens, 2002; Buskens
and Raub, 2002). Learning indicates that information
about behaviour of Alter in the past reaches Ego
through dyadic embeddedness, because Ego herself had
previous interactions with Alter, or through network
embeddedness, because Alter had previous interactions
with a third party (referred to as Tertius, hereafter)
who can inform Ego about Alter’s behaviour. Control,
on the other hand, refers to the possibility for Ego to
sanction or reward Alter depending on his behaviour.
The embedded nature of a trust relation provides Ego
with sanction and reward opportunities through
dyadic embeddedness, because Ego can punish
(reward) Alter for abusing (honoring) trust by with-
holding (placing) trust in future interactions, and
through network embeddedness, because Ego can affect
Alter’s reputation by informing third parties of his
behaviour, so that third parties will sanction (reward)
Alter in the future.
We concentrate on effects of learning through
dyadic and network embeddedness. We present
hypotheses based on a broad range of theories about
network effects on trust and test them using data from
a longitudinal complete network (see Van de Bunt,
1999). We focus on learning effects because control
effects require information on the behaviour of Alter
in interaction with Ego for all Ego-Alter pairs, or
information on the length of the expected common
future, but this information is hard to get in a work
environment, if not even impossible. Moreover,
experimental studies have shown that learning effects
are rather stable regardless of whether control effects
are included in the analyses (Barrera, 2005).
We study a situation with three types of actors (see
Figures 1 and 2), Ego, Alter, Tertius, and two types of
(directed) ties: trust and informal communication. We
represent actors with circles and directed relations with
arrows. Dotted lines indicate a relation of informal
communication; straight lines indicate a relation of
trust (or distrust). A straight arrow from Ego to Alter
indicates the trust relation from Ego to Alter. The state
of this relation at time t is our dependent variable. As
Ego assesses Alter’s trustworthiness on the basis of the
information available to her, the state of the trust
relation from Ego to Alter depends on information
originating from dyadic and network embeddedness.
Since we are investigating learning effects, we focus
on information about the past. Therefore, dyadic
embeddedness refers to previously existing relation-
ships between Ego and Alter. If the dependent variable
is measured at time t, dyadic embeddedness is
represented by the two arrows connecting Ego and
Alter at time t – 1. These indicate the extent to which
Ego trusted Alter at time t – 1 and the extent to which
Alter trusted Ego at time t – 1. In addition, we assume
that these two relations capture the past of the relation
between these two actors and that a trusting
relation indicates a positive past, whereas a distrust
relation indicates a negative past. For example, Ego
trusting Alter at time t – 1 implies that, as far as Ego is
informed, Alter has not abused trust before. We expect
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Figure 1 Dyadic embeddedness: trust (or distrust)
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affected by her own attitude toward Alter at time t – 1,
as well as by Alter’s attitude towards Ego at time t – 1.
That is, a trusting relation is more (less) likely after
positive (negative) past. The hypothesized influence
of Alter’s past attitude toward Ego on Ego’s present
attitude towards Alter is consistent also with a
preference for reciprocal relations found in numerous
longitudinal network studies. Therefore, we refer to
this effect as a reciprocity effect. This results in two
hypotheses on effects of learning through dyadic
embeddedness:
H1 The more Ego trusted Alter in the past, the more
Ego trusts Alter in the present.
H2 The more Alter trusted Ego in the past, the more
Ego trusts Alter in the present.
Hypothesis 1 may seem to be stating the obvious,
but it needs to be included for three reasons. First, this
hypothesis is consistent with existing learning models
(e.g. Buskens and Yamaguchi, 1999). Second, empirical
research on trust in embedded settings shows that the
effects of dyadic learning typically outweigh those of
network learning (Barrera and Buskens, 2008). Third,
it is necessary to control for dyadic learning in order to
avoid overestimating the network learning effects.
Turning to the effects of network embeddedness, in
Figure 2, the dotted line connecting Tertius to
Ego indicates the frequency at which Tertius talks to
Ego. The straight line connecting Tertius to Alter
and Ego to Tertius indicate the extent to which Tertius
trusts Alter and Ego trusts Tertius, respectively.
Consistent with information-diffusion type of models,
the information about Alter that Ego receives from
network embeddedness depends on the number of
third parties who talk regularly to Ego and on what
these third parties can tell Ego about Alter.
Furthermore, considering that there might be differ-
ences in the importance that Ego attaches to informa-
tion released by different third parties, we maintain
that information originating from third parties is more
important for Ego if she trusts these third parties and
less if she does not trust them.
Concerning the content of informal conversations
regularly occurring between Ego and third parties, we
assume that if third parties talk very often with Ego, it
is also likely that, during these conversations, they will
disclose the information they have about Alter’s
trustworthiness and that third parties who trust Alter
release positive information about him, whereas third
parties who distrust Alter release negative information
about him. The latter assumption is particularly
relevant because there is some empirical evidence for
types of effects of third-party information on inter-
personal trust that differ from what we hypothesize
here. Studying the same problem using ego-centered
network data of managers, Burt argued that, due to
etiquette regulating informal conversation among
colleagues, information about Alter disclosed to Ego
by third parties is selected so that it only confirms
Ego’s previous beliefs about Alter, without bringing
any new insight (Burt, 2005, p. 171 and passim). In
other words, Burt claims that third parties’ true
trusting attitude toward Alter is never communicated
to Ego, unless Ego and third parties already have the
same opinion about Alter. Burt referred to this effect
as echo. By contrast, the effect that we postulate in our
next two hypotheses corresponds to his alternative
mechanism, called bandwidth (Burt, 2005, p. 169 ff).
However, Burt’s evidence comes from cross-sectional
survey data, which do not allow observing network
changes. Therefore, the hypothesized mechanisms are
not explicitly tested. Moreover, most of the effects
reported are actually compatible both with echo and
bandwidth.
Summarizing, we maintain that Ego’s decision
whether to trust Alter will be positively influenced
by the number of third parties holding a trusting
relation towards Alter who talk regularly to Ego and
are trusted by her. Conversely, Ego’s decision whether
to trust Alter will be negatively influenced by the
number of third parties holding a distrusting relation
towards Alter who talk regularly to Ego and are
trusted by Ego. Hence, we posit the two following
hypotheses:
H3 The more information Ego received from third
parties who trust Alter, the more Ego trusts Alter.
H4 The more information Ego received from third
parties who distrust Alter, the more Ego distrusts Alter.
In addition, we expect the effect of negative
information to be stronger than the effect of positive
information, because trustworthiness could be simu-
lated. In a world where all trusting opinions are
formed according to third-party second-hand informa-
tion and where everybody knows that all trusting
opinions are formed according to third-party second-
hand information, an untrustworthy actor has an
incentive to fake trustworthiness in order to build a
positive reputation and then abuse trust at a later time.
Therefore, if third parties report to Ego that they trust
Alter, this information only implies that Alter has been
trustworthy so far. However, if third parties report to
Ego that they do not trust Alter, this information
could imply that Alter already abused trust with
them in the past. Thus, Ego should take negative
information into greater consideration than positive
information. This hypothesis is consistent with game-
theoretical arguments about repeated games with
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incomplete information (Kreps and Wilson, 1982).
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H5 Information stemming from third parties
distrusting Alter has a stronger effect on Ego’s trusting
decision vis-a`-vis Alter than information stemming
from third parties trusting Alter.
Data
Longitudinal network data were collected in a dialysis
department of a Dutch hospital. The collection of
quantitative data was preceded by 3 months of
participant observation. During this period, one
of the researchers worked and lived in the hospital.
He had the status of a student on work placement and
was dressed in the formal hospital outfit. This
observation period was important for the success of
the research in many ways (see Van de Bunt, 1997).
First and most important, it created a situation of
mutual trust between the employees and the
researcher. Second, the observation period permitted
to understand work processes and decision-making
procedures in the department. Third, it served to
retrieve useful information (e.g. about the history of
the department) to optimize the design of the
questionnaire. The first two objectives were obtained
by means of observation and informal talks, the latter
with interviews with key figures in the department.
Following the observation period, data were col-
lected once every 4 months for a period of 1 year. The
respondents were allowed to fill in the questionnaire at
home. During data collection, the respondents were
offered the possibility to contact telephonically the
researcher in case they needed help with some of the
questions. More information can be found in Van de
Bunt (1999). Below, we describe relevant parts for the
present project.
Historical Background
The description of the history of the dialysis depart-
ment is based on in-depth interviews with persons
occupying various functions (i.e. nursing and technical
staff, the head of the department, and a nephrologist).
On the basis of these interviews, the department can
be described as troublesome and rather hierarchically
organized. Through the years, there have been several
disputes between personnel with different specialties
(nursing versus dialysing), between personnel favour-
ing different dialysing methods, between personnel
with different ideas about leadership (task-oriented
versus people-oriented), and between personnel with
different levels of ambition. Most of these quarrels still
persisted during the data collection period. The former
head of the department, a people manager, was
replaced by the hospital management by a strictly
professional manager (almost 2 years before the data
were collected). The new manager did not want to
listen to those who, in her paraphrased words,
‘thought of work as a way to pass the day’, but
instead listened to and favoured the ambitious and
relatively highly educated staff. This attitude stimulated
mutual hostility among employees with different
characteristics. The climate at the department some-
what improved during the observation period, but
there were still many people gossiping about each
other and not trusting each other.
Personnel
Normally, the dialysis nurses are so-called A-nurses
with a degree in dialysis. However, because of the
shortage of personnel, some people had been hired
without the necessary qualification. Some of them still
worked there during the observation period. On the
other hand, the number of new employees who had
attended higher vocational training was increasing.
This difference was another source of friction (those
who had more working experience versus those who
had more formal training). Approximately, twice a
year, a new group of about three dialysis students
(holding a general degree) entered the department.
After successful completion of a 1-year training period,
they were usually offered a tenure position. During
that year, they were supervised by one of the dialysis
nurses. Their supervisor was also the first person with
whom the students spoke about the ins and outs of the
department and consequently its history. Therefore,
this relationship was very important. It influenced the
students’ view on the department and colleagues, as
well as their tendency to trust some colleagues and not
others. Consequently, depending on who was the
appointed supervisor, a student might get a certain
image of the department.
Normally, lunch breaks were taken in the hospital
cafeteria, but because of the safety of the patients,
dialysis nurses were not allowed to do so. They had
lunch in their own department. By contrast, the non-
nursing staff was allowed to take their breaks in the
official hospital cafeteria, but hardly anybody did. The
preliminary observation period showed that informal
communication took place during these lunches,
sometimes in the smoking area, and during work
within the dialysis rooms. Most communication in the
latter, however, was work-related, because it is
generally difficult to discuss personal matters
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or gossip about colleagues, while looking after the
patients.
At the start of the project, the employees had
worked at the dialysis department on average for
almost 8 years. This seems long, but a few members
raise the average. More importantly, a relatively large
part (33%) had worked less than one and a half year at
the department. All members were between 25 and 57
years old. Almost two-thirds of the staff, mostly
dialysis nurses, had irregular working hours, whereas
the rest (including some nurses) had regular working
hours from nine to five. Almost one-third of all
employees attended higher vocational school, and
finally, 80 per cent of all employees were female.
Table 1 shows the number of persons that were
employed during the data collection period. The
response rate was approximately 90 per cent.
Since the nursing staff worked in largely over-
lapping, but irregular shifts, every morning handing
over the relevant patient information was crucial. This
was done by means of written instructions. During the
rest of the day the handing over was done orally. These
day-to-day routines can easily go wrong because of ill
handwritings, imprecise instructions, lack of time to
discuss the handing over, etc.
The dialysis department held very many formal
gatherings, organized at regular time intervals, such as
staff meetings, work consultations, team consultations,
and patient consultations. Some of them were strictly
organized, but some were rather chaotic, did not have
standard procedures, and produced quite some fric-
tion. For example, work consultations—held once
every 3 weeks—were restricted to the nursing staff,
and much disorganized. In theory, they were allowed
to make decisions, but hardly anyone knew the
procedures. The minutes were made by volunteers,
mostly badly written and not to the point. Attendance
to these meetings was not compulsory. Thus, the
composition changed at every meeting. Consequently,
the atmosphere, the topics, and the solutions discussed
were often radically different every time. Moreover, the
meetings were used by some to gossip about absent
colleagues.
The way the meetings were (dis)organized, the
frequent hostility between (groups of) persons, and
the large number of (potential) sources of frictions in
the department made it difficult to trust each other.
Nevertheless, in such a context, the importance of
providing each other with reliable information regard-
ing patients is tremendous; peoples’ lives depend on it.
Mutual trust is therefore crucial, but at the same hard
to reach. This makes it necessary to understand how
trust is built and how getting information from third
parties may influence this process.
Measurements and Operationalizations
Our analyses are based on the answers to the following
question about trust:3 ‘We all feel closer to particular
people than to others. By ‘‘close’’ we mean how much
you confide in somebody. For example, whom do you
confide personal information. This can include both
private and work-related issues. Please indicate, for
each of the persons on the following list, which of
these five descriptions of your relationship to this
person fits best’. These are unknown, distrustful,
neutral, trustful, and very trustful; they were recoded
so that a trustful or very trustful relationship takes
value one, a neutral relationship takes value zero, and
a distrustful relationship takes value minus one. For
the informal communication network, the following
question was used: ‘During the past three months,
how frequently did you talk, during working time,
to your colleagues? It doesn’t matter what you were
talking about, but the conversation should have been
more than the transmission of a simple message or a
greeting’. This question had six answering categories
ranging from ‘never’ to ‘several times a day’.
The dependent variable is the trust tie from actor i
to actor j at time t: ytij. Both variables concerning
learning effects from dyadic embeddedness (hypotheses
1 and 2) have been constructed by taking the value of
the specific trust relation at the previous observation
point. Thus, we take the value of the trust relation
from i to j at time t – 1, yt1ij as operationalization of
i’s own past and we use the trust relation from j to i at
time t – 1, yt1ji to operationalize reciprocity.
The variables concerning effects of information from
third parties are constructed as follows. Assuming that
third parties trusting Alter release positive information
about him to Ego, while third parties distrusting
Alter release negative information about him to Ego,
Table 1 Personnel of the dialysis department
(changes in parentheses)
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
Dialysis nursesa 21 20(1) 22(þ2) 25(þ3)
Students 8 11(þ3) 10(3þ2) 7(3)
Supporting staffb 8 8 8 8
Secretary 2 1(1) 2(þ1) 2
Total 39 40 42 42
aIncluding: nurses, the head of the department and two team leaders.
bIncluding: laborants (2), social workers (2), techniciens (3), and
kitchen (1).
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the amount of positive information about Alter that
Ego receives depends on the number of third parties
holding a positive trust relation with Alter and talking
regularly to Ego. Thus, we constructed the variable







ki ðyt1ik þ 1Þ; k 6¼ i; k 6¼ j;
where xt1ki is the frequency at which k talks to i
measured at time t – 1, and yt1ik is the extent to which i
trusts k at time t – 1 and pt1kj ¼ 1 if yt1kj 4 0, and 0
otherwise; yt1kj is the trust relation between actor k and
actor j, the extent to which k trusts j at time t – 1.
Conversely, negative information is computed using
the same formula, but with pt1kj ¼ 1 if yt1kj 5 0, and 0
otherwise.4 Suppose, i is Ego, j is Alter, and k is
Tertius, the measures of the two relations xt1ki and y
t1
ki
indicate the frequency at which Tertius talks to Ego
and the amount of trust Tertius puts in Alter,
respectively. In congruence with our hypothesis, this
makes the two measures essential for the construction
of a variable operationalizing the amount of informa-
tion about Alter that is available to Ego. The third
term, yikþ 1, has been added in order to weight third-
party information by how much Ego trusts the specific
third party releasing the information. We weighted
third-party information by yikþ 1 rather than simply
by yik, because the latter would imply that positive
information becomes negative, and vice versa, if Ego
does not trust the informant. Conversely, weighting
third-party information by yikþ1 seems more realistic
as it implies that this information is highly valuable to
Ego if she trusts Tertius (yik ¼ 1), somewhat less
valuable if Ego is neutral toward Tertius (yik ¼ 0), and
it will be disregarded if Ego does not trust Tertius
(yik ¼ 1). Furthermore, we took the natural loga-
rithm of this sum to account for the fact that an
additional unit of positive (negative) information
should have a diminishing effect on Ego’s opinion
about Alter if Ego already has much positive (negative)
information about him.
Finally, we included several control variables and we
controlled for homophily effects. Homophily effects
were included as they are typically important pre-
dictors for the formation of close ties [see McPherson
et al. (2001) for a review]. Here, we controlled for
homophily effects concerning age and function. For
age, we constructed a dummy variable taking value 1
when the difference between the age of Ego and Alter
is smaller than 5, in absolute value. Since the personnel
of the department can be straightforwardly classified in
‘nursing’ and ‘non-nursing’, function homophily is
represented by a dummy variable taking value 1 for
dyads belonging to the same group.
We also controlled for effects of sex and type of
hierarchical relation between Ego and Alter. We looked
at gender effects comparing men and women in terms
of who trusts more and who is more trusted. We did
this by including in the analyses two dummies, one
taking value 1 when Ego is a man, the other taking
value 1 when Alter is a man. Hierarchical position in
the organization held by both Ego and Alter was
included in the analysis, because the formal structure
of an organization has been found to influence the
pattern of informal relations (e.g. Lazega and Van
Duijn, 1997). Therefore, we included two dummies,
one taking value 1 when Ego occupies a higher
position than Alter, the other taking value 1 when
Alter occupies a higher position than Ego. For both
variables, the reference category refers to the situation
in which Ego and Alter occupy the same position in
the hierarchy of the organization.
Descriptive Analyses
Before presenting tests of our hypotheses, we provide a
short description of the network data. Table 2, where
frequencies of trust and communication ties at the
four measurement points are displayed, shows that
there is considerable variation in the dependent
variable.
As anticipated in the section ‘Historical back-
ground’, the number of negative ties in the trust
network is relatively high: between 20 and 30 per cent
of the total at all time points. This indicates that the
data contain enough variation in the dependent
variable to observe effects of both positive and negative
information on trust relationships. Furthermore, the
composition of the network changed during data
collection as some employees left the department and
some others joined (see Table 1). Consequently,
newcomers could learn about the veterans and vice
versa. Table 2 also shows the distribution of the
informal communication network variable.
Examining the changes in the networks between
two subsequent time points, Table 3 displays the
number of ties changing and remaining constant in
the trust and in the communication networks in all
three time intervals. About a third of the trust ties
change value between all time points. This indicates
that the network of trust relations is changing
significantly over time. Consequently, we should have
enough statistical power to estimate the effects of
information.
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Looking at the communication network, more
than 50 per cent of these ties change in all three
time intervals between subsequent measurements.
However, most of the changes consist of small
oscillations, as illustrated by the last row of Table 3
displaying the frequencies of changes larger than
one unit in the network of informal communication.
Changes larger than one are only 9, 7.5, and 6.2
per cent of the total number of changes occurring
in the three time intervals, respectively. Moreover,
the average standard deviation of the values of
every communication tie between the four time
points is equal to only 0.53. Therefore, we can
conclude that the communication network is rather
stable. This result is as expected, because most
interactions are work related (see section ‘Personnel’).
As a result of this, even the effect of new persons
entering the department on the average frequency of
communication is relatively small.
As argued in the introduction, this indicates that
neglecting the effects of the trust network on the
communication network is not a severe limitation for
our analyses. Conversely, estimating the effects of
interpersonal communication on trust relations is not
problematic, because, while the structure of the
communication network is relatively constant, the
content of the information that the actors transmit
to each other depends on their trust relations and the
trust relations are changing over time.
Results
The unit of analysis consists of a directed dyad. Thus,
observations have multiple levels of interdependencies.
Table 2 Trust network and informal communication network: frequencies
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
N % N % N % N %
Trust network
Distrust 321 29.3 278 22.6 293 20.8 245 16.9
Neutral 508 46.4 558 45.3 727 51.6 723 49.8
Trust 265 24.2 395 32.1 389 27.6 484 33.3
Total 1,094 100 1,231 100 1,409 100 1,452 100
Communication network
Never 59 5.1 76 5.9 73 5.1 44 3
Less than once a month 316 27.4 192 14.8 285 19.8 232 15.7
1–3 times a month 418 36.2 497 38.4 533 37 603 40.8
1–3 times a week 317 27.5 465 35.9 476 33 507 34.3
Daily 43 3.7 65 5 75 5.2 93 6.3
Total 1,153 100 1,295 100 1,442 100 1,479 100
Table 3 Changes in the trust network and informal communication network: frequencies
From Time 1 to 2 From Time 2 to 3 From Time 3 to 4
N % N % N %
Trust network
Constant 660 65.7 755 67 919 65.7
Changed 345 34.3 373 33 480 34.3
Total 1,005 100 1,128 100 1,399 100
Communication network
Constant 519 47.8 573 48.3 774 53.8
Changed 566 52.2 614 51.7 665 46.2
Total 1,085 100 1,187 100 1,439 100
Change41 98 9 89 7.5 90 6.2
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Observations are (non-hierarchically) clustered within
Ego, within Alter, within time points, and within
dyads. In order to take these interdependencies into
account, we used a multilevel Social Relations Model
(Snijders and Kenny, 1999; Van Duijn et al., 1999)
including multiple observations of directed dyads over
time to predict the trust network at time t, given the
state of the networks at time t – 1. This model has
been developed to analyse relational data measured at
the dyadic level. In directed dyadic data, like ours, the
relation from Ego to Alter and the relation from Alter
to Ego are two different measures. That is, the trust
relation from Ego to Alter is a measure of how much
Ego trusts Alter, reported by Ego, while the relation
from Alter to Ego is a measure of how much Alter
trusts Ego, reported by Alter. A specific value on the
trust relation from Ego to Alter could be affected by
characteristics of Ego, such as her propensity to trust
others, in general. It could also be affected by
characteristics of Alter, such as his general trustworthi-
ness. It could be affected as well by relational-specific
features; Ego might trust a particular Alter, or Ego and
Alter could know and trust each other before they
became colleagues. Moreover, since we have four
subsequent measures for every relation, we have to
extend the original model by Snijders and Kenny
(1999) to take into account the dependence of
observations of the same dyads over time.
Summarizing, the data imply a complicated multi-
level model in which observations are nested through
time within directed dyads. Then, directed dyads are
pair-wise nested in undirected dyads. In addition to
this, directed dyads are non-hierarchically nested
within Egos as well as Alters. Our model includes
most of the random effects that are implied by this
structure and is specified as follows:
yijt ¼ t þ Zt1 þ Xij þ Ei þ RðijÞ þ Dij þ vijt ,
where yijt is the dependent variable, the trust relation
from i to j observed at time t. In order to control for
unmeasured variations due to the specific time in
which the observation took place, we included fixed
effects for time, t. Therefore, this model has
effectively three different constant terms, one for
each measurement time. Zt1 stands for the indepen-
dent variables built using observations measured at
time t – 1. Xij represents all time-constant covariates
depending on i or j. Ei is the random effect for the
error at the Ego level. R(ij) is the error at the dyad level
(taking care of the interdependence between the two
directed dyads ij and ji). Dij is the error at the level of
the (directed) dyad ij and vijt is the residual at the
observation level. The inclusion of a random effect at
the level of Alter, or the possibility that residuals differ
between time points, did not lead to different
substantive results. Therefore, we choose to present
the simpler model specified above.
As we do not have any information about the trust
and information networks in the period before our
first observation, we do not have measurements of the
lagged variables Zt1 for the first time point. Therefore,
we estimate change in trust relations only in the
second, third, and fourth observations as a function of
information available to the actors at the first, second
and third time point, respectively. However, observa-
tions concerning trust relations at the first time point
are included in the independent variables, as part of
the information about the past available to the actors
at the second time point. The data are organized in
dyadic format and missing data are computed listwise.
The number of actors included in the analyses
presented below is 40. However, the number of
observations is not equal to n(n 1) per every time
point due to missing values. However, as our response
rate was relatively high (about 90 per cent), our
analyses explain trust dynamics in the department with
sufficient accuracy.
The results of the multilevel Social Relation Models
are shown in Table 4 where three different models are
presented. Model 1 is presented as a benchmark,
including only the fixed effects for time. Model 2
contains only control variables. In model 3, four
variables referring to hypotheses 1–4 are added.
Looking at the maximum likelihood, we can see that
it improves significantly from model 1 to model 3.
However, the difference in the maximum likelihood is
particularly large when comparing models 1 and 2 with
model 3. This indicates that models including only
fixed effects for time (model 1) and time-constant
characteristics of the actors (model 2) fit the data less
well than a model including also time-varying network
variables (models 3). In model 1, the fixed effects for
time indicate that, on average, there is more trust at
the fourth time point. The random effects in model 1
show that there is considerable unexplained variance at
all levels. The value of the residual vijt increases in
models including effects of the main explanatory
variables, while the random effects related to dyads
are estimated at zero. This probably indicates that the
additional independent variables included in model 3,
such as own past and reciprocity, explain mainly
variance at the level of the dyads and that, due to
the reduction in unexplained variance at the dyadic
level, the estimation process has difficulties in disen-
tangling random effects at the dyadic level from the
residual at the observation level.
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In model 3, the main effects concerning learning
through dyadic embeddedness (own past and recipro-
city), as well as network embeddedness (positive and
negative information), are significant in the expected
direction. Dyadic embeddedness has a positive effect,
indicating that Ego’s trusting attitude versus Alter in
the present is strongly influenced by positive experi-
ence, as captured by both Ego’s trust in Alter in the
past and Alter’s trust in Ego in the past. Positive
information about Alter has a positive effect on Ego’s
trust in Alter and negative information has a negative
effect. Thus, hypotheses 1 through 4 are supported.
Hypothesis 5 on the difference between the effect of
positive and negative information is also supported:
given the size of the two coefficients and relative
standard errors in model 3 the effect of negative
information is significantly larger than the effect of
positive information.
Turning to the control variables, few have a
significant effect on trust. Moreover, these results are
rather unstable across models, which is not a strange
result given the small size of our population. Only the
effects of hierarchical relations and function homophily
are significant both in models 2 and 3. Ego is less likely
to trust Alter when Ego occupies a higher position
than Alter in the formal hierarchy, and more likely to
trust Alter when either both are nurses or both are not
nurses. The only other significant effect is gender: men
seem to be slightly more trusted than women (but only
in model 3). All other control variables are not
significant in any of the models.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we study the effects of information
circulating in a network on the evolution of inter-
personal trust relations among members of the
network. The network consists of employees of a
dialysis department of a Dutch hospital. The data
consist of four measurements of the complete networks
of interpersonal trust and informal communication at
work, taken every 3 months during 1 year. Our results
strongly support the view that interpersonal trust in
social networks develops by means of a learning
mechanism (e.g. Gulati, 1995; Barrera, 2007; Barrera
and Buskens, 2008). However, unlike previous studies,
Table 4 Random effects regression models
Dependent variable: Ego’s trust in Alter
Independent variables (Hyp.a) Exp. sign Coefficient (standard error)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant (time 2) 0.121 (0.053) 0.241 (0.060) 0.522 (0.078)
Constant (time 3) 0.097 (0.052) 0.216 (0.060) 0.393 (0.081)
Constant (time 4) 0.183 (0.052) 0.304 (0.060) 0.513 (0.080)
Own past (H1) þ 0.457 (0.016)
Reciprocity (H2) þ 0.150 (0.014)
Positive information from third parties (H3) þ 0.028 (0.014)
Negative information from third parties (H4) – 0.144 (0.014)
Control variables
Ego is a man 0.147 (0.111) 0.078 (0.078)
Alter is a man 0.027 (0.039) 0.070 (0.024)
Ego is higher 0.174 (0.045) 0.067 (0.027)
Alter is higher 0.064 (0.048) 0.021 (0.029)
Same age 0.027 (0.045) 0.013 (0.022)
Same function 0.216 (0.041) 0.047 (0.023)
Model statistics
Random effect at the Ego level 0.089 (0.022) 0.069 (0.017) 0.034 (0.008)
Random effect at the undirected dyad level 0.174 (0.014) 0.159 (0.014) 0.000 (0.000)
Random effect at the directed dyad level 0.068 (0.009) 0.069 (0.009) 0.000 (0.000)
Random effect at the observation level 0.195 (0.006) 0.195 (0.006) 0.269 (0.007)
Number of observations 3,266 3,266 3,266
Number of subjects 40 40 40
Maximum likelihood 5673.72 5624.15 5058.48
aHypothesis 5 concerns the difference between the effects of positive and negative information from third parties.
,  Indicate two-sided significance levels of P50.05, P50.01, respectively.
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this paper provides evidence of learning effects in an
intra-organizational setting using longitudinal com-
plete network data.
Using two network variables, we constructed, for
every node (Ego), an individual measure of both
positive and negative information about every other
node (Alter), which is available to Ego through third
parties at every time point. Then, we used the
measures at a given time point to predict interpersonal
trust from any Ego to any Alter at the subsequent time
point. The hypotheses are based on learning models
through dyadic and network embeddedness. Results
show that both types are important. Actors learn to
trust from their own past experiences and prefer to
reciprocate pre-existing relations. Positive information
about Alter, available to Ego in the past, makes Ego’s
trust in Alter in the present more likely, while negative
information about Alter, available to Ego in the past,
makes Ego’s trust in Alter in the present less likely.
Given that this result is found in a quarrelsome
atmosphere, the management of the dialysis depart-
ment should be wary of escalation of distrust. New
people are entering the department on a regular basis
while some of those who are dissatisfied with the
management still occupy relevant positions in terms of
the supervision of new students. Thus, the manage-
ment has to deal with the influence process due to
which people make others trust or distrust colleagues,
as this process might ultimately lead to a decrease in
cooperation between different subgroups. Luckily for
the management, the new students are increasingly
highly educated and not so easily impressed by the
sitting staff anymore. It is a matter of years before
the young, educated, and ambitious staff outnumbers
the veterans, as some will retire or leave, for instance,
because of developments in ICT. In this respect, a
good sign for the management is that, during the
observation period, the average degree of intrinsic job
satisfaction increased (Van de Bunt, 1999). Given our
results, the management could develop a policy for the
appointment of nurses to the supervision of students,
aiming at reducing the spread of distrust.
Some issues concerning our analyses merit discus-
sion. First, the communication network variable
consists of communication at work between all
employees, measured at four time points. However,
concerning the content of this informal communica-
tion, we only know that it should be ‘more than the
transmission of a simple message or a greeting’ as
indicated in the question. Thus, our results are based
on the assumption that colleagues talking more often
with each other at work are more likely to release
information about whom of the other colleagues they
trust and whom they do not trust. Furthermore, it is
assumed that Ego considers more seriously informa-
tion received from people she trusts herself. This
assumption contradicts Burt (2005), who argues that,
due to etiquette, informal conversations among
colleagues only produce a reinforcement of pre-existing
beliefs (i.e. echo) without providing any information
from which actors could learn about others (i.e.
bandwidth). Nevertheless, our results are consistent
with bandwidth and not with echo. Compared to
Burt’s analysis, our conclusions are based on analyses
of a relatively small network. This difference is
important, because our network members are collea-
gues working in the same department, who meet
regularly and therefore probably have a denser net-
work, characterized by less superficial relationships for
which etiquette is presumably less important.
Second, our research is one of the very few studies
on the effects of learning on trust using longitudinal
survey data. In this respect, our results have higher
external validity than comparable studies using experi-
mental data. By contrast, a limit of our approach is
that, unlike in experimental studies, we do not have
any information about the actual behaviour of our
respondents. Consequently, our results support effects
of learning concerning attitudes rather than behaviour.
Since actual behaviour is not observed, we cannot
make any claim concerning either how these attitudes
translate into behaviour, or how actual behaviour
influences trusting attitudes.
Third, the response rate was about 90 per cent. In
general, missing data constitute a severe problem,
particularly when studying complete networks. Given
additional analyses, including sensitivity analyses,
which we do not discuss in the article, the problem
seems moderate, as far as the results on learning effects
are concerned. In fact, these results were consistent
across different models that we estimated and they
were not significantly affected by the inclusion of
control variables. By contrast, the results concerning
control variables are not so robust. Typically, they vary
depending on which model is estimated and which
other variables are included in the model. This is not
surprising, as control variables vary only across
respondents and the respondents are only 40.
Accordingly, although they are not implausible, the
reported effects of our control variables should not be
taken too seriously. For the same reason, we were not
able to include other potentially interesting individual
attributes, such as seniority.
Fourth, we study the relationships of trust and
communication existing among the employees by
looking at four snapshots taken 3 months after each
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other. Doing this, we implicitly assume that the
relations observed at the first time point coincide
with the origin of this network. It would be interesting
to replicate the current analysis on a complete network
observed from its origin—for example, a network of
first year high school freshmen—to see if our results
are robust.
Fifth, analysing four snapshots, we ignore what
happened in the 3 months elapsing between each of
them. This problem could be better addressed applying
statistical models for the evolution of networks, which
assume that networks evolve continuously through
time and are designed to model unobserved network
changes (Snijders, 2005). However, at the current state
of the art, the statistical package for the analyses of
these models cannot be used to model the co-evolution
of two networks changing simultaneously, as we
hypothesize here. Further developments in this line
of research could profit from both availability of more
sophisticated statistical tools to analyse such dynamic
data, as well as from the collection of new dynamic
network data.
Notes
1. For reader friendliness, we will refer to Ego and
Alter using female and male pronouns,
respectively.
2. However, models of network control generally
adopt forward-looking rationality: it is the con-
cern for future losses caused by a bad reputation
that influences the actions of the actors.
3. The original wording was in Dutch. Nuances
might have been lost in the translation.
4. Consequently, if yt1kj ¼ 0, pt1kj ¼ 0. If Tertius’
trust attitude versus Alter is neutral, he or she will
release neutral information to Ego. This implies
that neutral information has no effects on Ego’s
assessment of Alter’s trustworthiness.
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